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Abstract
Background
Around the world government agencies responsible for the selection and reimbursement of
prescribed medicines and other health technologies are considering how best to bring com-
munity preferences into their decision making. In particular, community views about the dis-
tribution or equity of funding across the population. These official committees and agencies
often have access to the best available and latest evidence on clinical effectiveness, safety
and cost from large clinical trials and population-based studies. All too often they do not
have access to high quality evidence about community views. We therefore, conducted a
large and representative population-based survey in Australia to determine what community
members think about the factors that do and should influence government spending on pre-
scribed medicines.
Methods
A choice-based survey was designed to elicit the importance of individual criteria when con-
sidering the equity of government spending on prescribed medicines. A representative sam-
ple of 3080 adult Australians completed the survey by allocating a hypothetical budget to
different combinations of money spent on two patient populations. Societal preferences
were inferred from absolute majority responses i.e. populations with more than 50% of
respondents’ allocation for a particular allocation criterion.
Results
This study shows that, all else being equal, severity of disease, diseases for which there is
no alternative treatment available on the government formulary, diseases that affect patients
who are not financially well off, and life-style unrelated diseases are supported by the public
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as resource allocation criteria. Where ‘all else is not equal’, participants allocated more
resources to the patient population that gained considerable improvement in health and
fewer resources to those that gained little improvement in health. This result held under all
scenarios except for ‘end-of-life treatments’.
Responses to cost (and corresponding number of patients treated) trade-off scenarios
indicated a significant reduction in the proportion of respondents choosing to divide
resources equally and a shift in preference towards devoting resources to the population
that were more costly to treat for all criteria with the exception of severity of disease.
Conclusions
The general public have clear views on what’s fair in terms of government spending on pre-
scribed medicines. In addition to supporting the application of the ‘rule of rescue’, important
considerations for government spending included the severity of disease being treated, dis-
eases for which there is no alternative treatment available on the government formulary, dis-
eases that affect patients who are not financially well off and life-style unrelated diseases.
This study shows that the general public are willing to share their views on what constitutes
an equitable allocation of the government’s drug budget. The challenge remains to how best
to consider those views alongside clinical and economic considerations.
Introduction
Since the 1940s, the Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (PBS), Australia’s national formulary for
publicly subsidised medicines, has endeavoured to provide all citizens and residents with
timely and equitable access to affordable, safe and effective medicines. While most PBS medi-
cines are dispensed by community pharmacies and used by patients at home, some medicines
are supplied through different distribution arrangements (Section 100 programs) e.g. distribu-
tion from hospital outpatient departments [1, 2].
The process for listing medicines on the PBS is underpinned by legislation that requires an
independent expert committee, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), to
consider clinical effectiveness, safety and cost-effectiveness relative to existing therapies [3]
prior to making a recommendation to the Minister of Health for listing a drug on the PBS.
Evidence suggests that the PBAC has been broadly consistent in its use of economic effi-
ciency as a key criterion for decision making. George et al [4], for example, analysed PBAC
recommendations for the listing of drugs on the Australian PBS between 1991 and 1996, and
demonstrated that drugs with lower cost-effectiveness ratios had a higher chance of gaining a
positive recommendation and subsidy. However, cost-effectiveness was not the only factor
determining the PBAC’s recommendation. Other factors such as clinical need for the product
and lack, or inadequacy, of alternative treatments also figured in the PBAC recommendations
[4]. Harris et al [5] analysed PBAC recommendations between 1994 and 2004 and demon-
strated that clinical significance, cost effectiveness, cost to the government and severity of dis-
ease were all significant influences on PBAC recommendations and concluded that there was
no evidence of a fixed threshold for the value of a life year or a quality adjusted life year
(QALY) [5].
While such retrospective analyses are important, they do not tell us much about societal
views on funding new medicines with respect to distributional equity. To answer this question,
we need to take into consideration societal views on the selection and reimbursement of
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prescribed medicines. One area that is particularly in need of societal input is that of high cost
anti-cancer medicines given the rapid emergence of new, expensive and innovative medicines
[6] as well as an increasing prevalence of cancer [7].
While there does not appear to be evidence that cancer patients are at a systematic disad-
vantage when it comes to PBAC recommendations [8], rejections of new anti-cancer medi-
cines have been contentious, and often result in public indignation and organised campaigns
to lobby for better drug access and coverage [9, 10]. This kind of dissent suggests that there
remains a significant gap between policy makers and the public when it comes to assessments
of the value of new anti-cancer drugs [11]. A recent Senate Inquiry conducted by the Austra-
lian government focused on examining timely access and affordability of anti-cancer drugs,
and how this impacts upon the quality of cancer care [12]. The resulting Senate Report con-
cluded that the Government needs to undertake a “comprehensive review” of its processes for
funding anti-cancer medicines, including considerations of “managed access” programs and
“more flexible evidential requirements”. However the report had little to say about how to
ensure that the system remains robust and sustainable [12].
Given the number of new high-cost anti-cancer drugs expected to be marketed in coming
years, and limits to the amount of money that governments are willing to spend on medicines,
reimbursement will continue to be a key challenge for decision makers in all healthcare sys-
tems [13, 14]. Bodies such as the PBAC will need to continually weigh up competing ethical,
clinical, epistemic and economic considerations. One approach to assisting policymakers in
striking the right balances and compromises is to ask the public who should have access to sub-
sidised medicines and what decision characteristics (factors) should be considered when
assessing overall societal value of a new medicine [15].
Previous studies have elicited the general public’s preferences for access to publicly subsi-
dised medicines. For example, a pilot study by Whitty and colleagues [16] found that the pub-
lic (n = 161) and individual decision makers involved in the PBAC process (n = 11) preferred
to treat those with severe illness. More recently, Linley et al [17] conducted a survey to elicit
general public views about the criteria used by the National Institute of Health and Care Excel-
lence (NICE) for accepting higher incremental cost effectiveness ratios for some medicines over
others, and about the introduction of the Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) in England. Linley et al
[17] showed that the general public supported trade-offs in equity and efficiency in the allocation
of health care resources. However, it is not clear if UK societal preferences reflect preferences of
the Australian public for pharmaceutical funding decisions. Further, studies have been under-
taken among different stakeholder groups (including payers, government agencies, patients,
healthcare professionals, academia or the general public) in a different context based on a multi-
attribute approach to identify criteria or factors that could influence healthcare resources alloca-
tion [18, 19]. Vogler et al [18] elicited preferences about policy objectives while the study by
Tordrup et al [19] focussed on the policy options for future health system financing.
The aim of this study was to explore preferences of the Australian public when it comes to
government spending on medicines.
Methods
Questionnaire design
We conducted a survey of 3080 members of the Australian general public to identify criteria
that are important to the public when assessing new medicines for PBS spending. The on-line
survey was based on a recent preference survey conducted by Linley et al in the UK [17] and
adapted to issues relevant to the Australian PBS. Respondents were presented with two hypo-
thetical patient groups and 12 different scenarios where the only difference between each
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scenario was a single criterion. Those criteria included: severity of disease, availability of an
alternative treatment, innovation in drug mechanism, carer burden, disadvantaged popula-
tions (patients who are not financially well off), age (children), life expectancy, disease type
(specifically cancer), prevalence of disease, cost, return to work benefits, life-style related dis-
ease. A summary of the 12 allocation criteria and trade-off scenarios explored in this study are
presented in Table 1. Each of the 12 allocation criteria is known to be considered by the Aus-
tralian drug selection committee (PBAC) when making a recommendation for listing on the
PBS or supported by the published literature as important criteria for resource allocation deci-
sions [16, 17, 20–22].
The potential importance of each criterion was quantified by asking each respondent to
allocate notional PBS money to combinations of 100 patients, those combinations representing
more or fewer patients with a particular criterion (such as patients with severe vs. moderate
disease). This was done for all 12 scenarios. For example, if the respondent allocated the PBS
budget to 50 patients with moderate disease and 50 patients with severe disease (all else being
equal), this indicates indifference to disease importance in the distribution of beneficiaries
when allocating the PBS budget. An allocation of more than 50% to patients with severe dis-
ease would indicate a societal preference for distributing the drug budget to patients receiving
treatment for severe disease i.e. societal preferences were inferred from absolute majority
responses for a particular allocation criterion.
The second part of study involved splitting the total respondent sample into two cohorts.
Cohort 1 respondents were asked to complete an additional set of trade-offs where the estimate
of benefit was varied for each of the two hypothetical patient groups (see S1 File). For cohort 2
respondents, the trade-offs varied according to the cost implications of each criterion (see S2
File). In this way the survey design was consistent with the Linley study [17] and minimised
the burden on survey respondents.
Fig 1 presents the text introducing the 12 allocation criteria. Fig 2 provides an example of
the text of the prioritisation question using cancer treatments as the allocation criterion of
interest.
Administration
Participants and recruitment. The target sample size of this study was informed by stud-
ies reported in the literature [17, 23, 24] and available resources. The sample of 3080 partici-
pants (aged 18 years or older) was drawn from members of the Australian public enrolled on
the panel of a market research company. A ‘minimum quota’ approach controlled by gender,
age and geographical area (state of residence) was used to ensure that the sample was represen-
tative of the general adult Australian population. As described above, participants were divided
into two cohorts exploring two different kinds of ‘trade-offs’.
Pilot survey. In August 2015, a pilot survey was conducted with 111 participants to test
the logistics, flow and user friendliness of the survey. An additional question regarding the
state of residence was added after pilot testing. Following completion of pilot testing, the full
survey was administered during October 2015 and closed when our target of 3000 complete
responses (i.e. 1500 per cohort) was achieved (by the end of the month).
Ethics. Ethical approval of the study was obtained from the ethics committee at Sydney
University (protocol number: 2014/906).
Statistical analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to summarize demographic variables. Responses to both parts
of the survey (i.e. both the ‘all else being equal’ condition and the trade-off condition) were
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Table 1. Allocation criteria explored including cost and benefit trade-off scenarios.
Allocation criteria
explored
Baseline: All else being equal (equal
treatment costs and effectiveness)
Benefit trade-off scenario Cost trade-off scenario
Severity of disease1 Should more PBS money go to patients
with severe health problems (Pop 1)
compared to those with moderate health
problems (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for severe disease
compared with moderate disease
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for severe disease
compared with moderate disease
Availability of alternative
treatment option as proxy
for unmet need1
Should more PBS money go to patients
for whom there are no alternative
treatments available on the PBS (Pop 1)
compared to those for whom there are
several alternative treatments already
available on the PBS (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for the disease with no
alternative treatment available on the
PBS compared with the disease with
several alternative treatments already
available on the PBS
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for the disease with
no alternative treatment available on the
PBS compared with the disease with
several alternative treatments already
available on the PBS
Innovative medicines Should more PBS money go to treatments
that work in new ways (Pop 1) compared
to treatments that work the same way as
existing treatments (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for medicine that has an
innovative mechanism of action
compared with medicine that works in
the same way as other existing
medicines
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for medicine that has
an innovative mechanism of action
compared with medicine that works in
the same way as other existing
medicines
Care burden/wider
societal benefit1
Should more PBS money go to patients
who have to rely on carers for their day-to-
day needs (Pop 1) compared to those who
do not have to rely on carers (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for disease that causes
patients to be dependent on carers (e.g.
family members) for day-to- day needs
compared with the disease that allows
patients to remain independent
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for disease that
causes patients to be dependent on
carers (e.g. family members) for day-to-
day needs compared with the disease
that allows patients to remain
independent
Disadvantaged
populations1
Should more PBS money go to patients
who are not financially well-off (Pop 1)
compared to those who are financially
well-off (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for disease that typically
affects patients who are not financially
well-off (e.g. patients from low income
families) compared with the disease that
typically affects patients who are
financially well-off
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for disease that
typically affects patients who are not
financially well-off (e.g. patients from
low income families) compared with the
disease that typically affects patients
who are financially well-off
Children1 Should more PBS money go to treating
children (Pop 1) compared to treating
adults (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for children compared with
adults
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for children
compared with adults
Life expectancy/end of
life treatments1
Should more PBS money go to patients
who would die within 18 months without
treatment (Pop 1) compared patients who
would die within 60 months without
treatment (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain (life extension of 3 months
vs. 6 months) for patients with a life
expectancy of 18 months compared
with 60 months without treatment
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for patients with a life
expectancy of 18 months compared
with 60 months without treatment
Cancer treatments1 Should more PBS money go to patients
who have cancer (Pop 1) compared to
patients with a non-cancer disease (Pop
2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for patients with cancer
compared with non-cancer disease
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for patients with
cancer compared with non-cancer
disease
Rare disease therapies1 Should more PBS money go to patients
with rare diseases (Pop 1) compared to
those with common diseases (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for patients with a rare
disease compared with common
disease
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for patients with a
rare disease compared with common
disease
Cost to the PBS and
savings to patients
Should more PBS money go to patients
whose out of pocket costs without PBS
subsidy would be high (Pop 1) compared
to those whose out of pocket costs would
be low (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for patients with a disease
that costs the PBS $5000/saves
patients $4960 per month compared
with the disease that costs the PBS
$100/saves patients $60 per month
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for patients with a
disease that costs the PBS $5000/
saves patients $4960 per month
compared with the disease that costs
the PBS $100/saves patients $60 per
month
Medicines that help
patients return to work
Should more PBS money go to patients
whose diseases affect their ability to work
(Pop 1) compared to those who are able to
continue working despite their disease
(Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for disease that impacts
upon patients’ ability to work compared
with disease that does not prevent
patients from working without treatment
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for disease that
impacts upon patients’ ability to work
compared with disease that does not
prevent patients from working without
treatment
(Continued )
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analyzed by classifying responses into three groups: (1) respondents favoring Population 1; (2)
respondents favoring an equal allocation between the two competing populations; (3) respon-
dents favoring Population 2. Societal preferences were inferred from absolute majority
responses i.e. populations with more than 50% of respondents’ allocation for a particular allo-
cation criterion. This was repeated for each of the 12 allocation criteria explored. Responses to
Part 1 questions from cohorts 1 and 2 were pooled (as both cohorts were asked the same set of
‘all else being equal’ questions). Part 2 results (trade-off questions) were analyzed by cohort.
Shift in preferences was determined using each cohort’s preferences under the assumption of
‘all else being equal’ as a baseline. McNemar’s test was used to determine the statistical signifi-
cance of any relative shifts in preferences between Parts 1 and 2 by cohort. Exact conditional
logistic regression was used to obtain odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals.
Logistic regression modeling using gender, age, marital status, education status, health sta-
tus, cancer history, country of birth, private health status, employment status, household
Table 1. (Continued)
Allocation criteria
explored
Baseline: All else being equal (equal
treatment costs and effectiveness)
Benefit trade-off scenario Cost trade-off scenario
Life style related
diseases and individual
responsibility
Should more PBS money go to patients
with a disease unrelated to lifestyle (Pop
1) compared to those with diseases that
are related to lifestyle (Pop 2)?
Trade-off scenario explored smaller
health gain for disease that is unrelated
to lifestyle compared with the disease
that is lifestyle related
Trade-off scenario explored higher
costs of treatment for disease that is
unrelated to lifestyle compared with the
disease that is lifestyle related
1 Criteria that were the same as those explored in the UK study by Linley et al.
Abbreviation: Pop = population
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172971.t001
Fig 1. Text introducing the 12 allocation criteria.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172971.g001
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income, dependent children and state of residence was conducted to determine their impact
on respondents’ expressed baseline funding preferences on the 12 allocation criteria (i.e. under
the assumption of ‘all else being equal’). Model fit was tested using the Hosmer and Lemeshow
[25] goodness-of-fit test. All statistical analyses ware performed using version 9.4 of SAS.
Results
Demographics
A total of 3080 adult members of the general public in Australia completed the on-line survey.
The second part of the survey–the benefit and cost trade-off scenarios–required splitting the
sample into two equal sized cohorts. The characteristics of the respondents in each of the
cohorts were almost identical (Table 2).
All respondents: Allocation preferences under the assumption of ‘all else
being equal’
Table 3 summarises respondents’ baseline (“all else being equal”) preferences for allocating
PBS funds between two competing populations according to each of the 12 allocation criteria.
Allocation criteria considered more important than their alternatives (i.e.
with more than 50% of respondents’ allocation)
Of the allocation criteria explored, all else being equal, respondents expressed a preference
(inferred from absolute majority responses) for allocating PBS money on medicines (1) treat-
ing severe diseases (as opposed to moderate diseases): 52.7%, (2) treating diseases for which
there is no alternative treatment available on the PBS (compared to those where several alter-
native treatments are available): 53.6%, (3) treating diseases that affect patients who are not
financially well off (as opposed to those that affect patients who are financially well off): 62.3%,
and (4) treating life-style unrelated diseases (rather than life-style related diseases): 51.7%.
Allocation criteria considered equally important. All else being equal, between 55.1 to
57.6% of respondents divided resources evenly on medicines treating: (1) diseases affecting
children vs. adults (55.1%) and (2) cancer vs. non-cancer (57.6%).
Benefit and cost trade-off scenarios. Table 3 summarises the effects of varying health
gains (Cohort 1) and treatment costs (Cohort 2) on respondents’ allocation preferences for
each of the 12 allocation criteria explored.
Effect of varying health gains on respondents’ allocation preferences (benefit trade-
off). A total of 1533 respondents (Cohort 1) completed the benefit trade-off scenarios for the
12 allocation criteria explored. This group was asked to reassess their original allocations on
the assumption that one population would gain a small health improvement, while the other
would gain a large health improvement.
Removing the assumption of equal treatment effectiveness resulted in a statistically signifi-
cant shift in respondents’ allocation preferences away from the population that gained a ‘little
health improvement’ towards the population that gained a ‘considerable health improvement’
for all criteria with the exception of ‘end-of-life treatments’. Results for the ‘end-of-life treat-
ments’ criterion indicated a shift in respondents’ preferences away from the ‘considerable
health improvement’ population to favouring an equal allocation between the two competing
populations under the benefit trade-off condition. However, the proportion of respondents
Fig 2. Summary of the survey format using cancer as an example criterion. Socio-demographic data were collected to
assess associations between respondents’ characteristics and views on the allocation criterion (see Table 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172971.g002
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Table 2. Characteristics of respondents (N = 3080).
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Combined Australia3
Characteristics (N = 1533) (N = 1547) (N = 3080)
n % n % n % %
Gender
Male 749 48.9 753 48.7 1502 48.8 48.9
Female 784 51.1 794 51.3 1578 51.2 51.1
Age (years)
18–24 186 12.1 188 12.2 374 12.1 12.2
25–34 268 17.5 274 17.7 542 17.6 18.0
35–44 299 19.5 297 19.2 596 19.4 18.5
45–54 276 18.0 277 17.9 553 18.0 17.9
55–64 240 15.7 241 15.6 481 15.6 15.2
65+ 264 17.2 270 17.5 534 17.3 18.2
Marital status
Married/de facto 908 59.2 924 59.7 1832 59.5
Separated/divorced 156 10.2 152 9.8 308 10.0
Widowed 55 3.6 43 2.8 98 3.2
Never married 414 27.0 428 27.7 842 27.3
Education
Never attended school/ primary/ some high school 211 13.8 220 14.2 431 14.0
Completed high school 318 20.7 309 20.0 627 20.4
University, TAFE etc. 998 65.1 1011 65.4 2009 65.2
Prefer not to answer 6 0.4 7 0.5 13 0.4
Cancer history
Cancer history with death1 597 38.9 578 37.4 1175 38.1
Cancer history with no death/death unknown 243 15.9 246 15.9 489 15.9
No cancer history 673 43.9 703 45.4 1376 44.7
Prefer not to answer 20 1.3 20 1.3 40 1.3
General health
Very good 267 17.4 277 17.9 544 17.7
Good 750 48.9 731 47.3 1481 48.1
Average 408 26.6 434 28.1 842 27.3
Poor/ very poor 108 7.0 105 6.8 213 6.9
Country of birth
Australia 1141 74.4 1144 73.9 2285 74.2
Overseas 392 25.6 403 26.1 795 25.8
Private health insurance
Yes 896 58 918 59 1814 59
No 637 42 629 41 1266 41
Employment status
Working full time 546 35.6 536 34.6 1082 35.1
Working part time 303 19.8 319 20.6 622 20.2
Currently not working, but looking for work 179 11.7 197 12.7 376 12.2
Retired 327 21.3 342 22.1 669 21.7
Other 178 11.6 153 9.9 331 10.7
Household annual income
$0 to 20,000 120 7.8 129 8.3 249 8.1
$20,001–40,000 310 20.2 300 19.4 610 19.8
(Continued )
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favouring the population that gained a ‘little health improvement’ remained unchanged when
compared to the ‘all else being equal’ assumption (24.2% vs. 24.2%, OR = 1.00, p = 1.00).
Whilst there was an overall shift away from the ‘little’ to ‘considerable’ health improvement
population, between 42.4 to 52.3% of respondents remained in favour of treating the former.
This was despite the assumption that these patients would derive a little improvement in health
compared with a considerable health improvement for the following allocation criteria: (1)
treating diseases for which there is no alternative treatment available on the PBS instead of dis-
eases for which several alternative treatments are available (47.1%), (2) treating diseases that
affect patients who are not financially well off rather than the financially well off (52.3%), and
(3) treating life-style unrelated diseases rather than the life-style related diseases (42.4%).
Effect of varying treatment costs on respondents’ allocation preferences (cost trade-
off). A total of 1547 respondents (Cohort 2) completed the cost trade-off scenarios for the 12
allocation criteria explored. This group was asked to reassess their original allocations on the
assumption that one population would be more costly to treat than the other. Therefore, the
Table 2. (Continued)
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Combined Australia3
Characteristics (N = 1533) (N = 1547) (N = 3080)
n % n % n % %
$40,001 to 80,000 427 27.9 436 28.2 863 28.0
$80,001 to 180,000 436 28.4 438 28.3 874 28.4
$180,001 and over 65 4.2 69 4.5 134 4.4
Prefer not to answer 175 11.4 175 11.3 350 11.4
Personal annual income
$0 to 20,000 380 24.8 374 24.2 754 24.5
$20,001–40,000 364 23.7 347 22.4 711 23.1
$40,001 to 80,000 395 25.8 397 25.7 792 25.7
$80,001 to 180,000 203 13.2 219 14.2 422 13.7
$180,001 and over 23 1.5 24 1.6 47 1.5
Prefer not to answer 168 11.0 186 12.0 354 11.5
Household composition
With financially dependent children 453 29.5 474 30.6 927 30.1
Without financially dependent children 1080 70.5 1073 69.4 2153 69.9
State
Australian Capital Territory 24 1.6 23 1.5 47 1.5 1.7
New South Wales 496 32.4 489 31.6 985 32.0 32.2
Northern Territory 3 0.2 7 0.5 10 0.3 0.9
Queensland 292 19.0 295 19.1 587 19.1 19.9
South Australia 117 7.6 119 7.7 236 7.7 7.6
Tasmania 36 2.3 34 2.2 70 2.3 2.3
Victoria 368 24.0 377 24.4 745 24.2 25.1
Western Australia 142 9.3 147 9.5 289 9.4 10.4
Unknown2 55 3.6 56 3.6 111 3.6 -
1 The variable ‘cancer history with death’ pertains to cancer related deaths in close family members of the survey respondents.
2 The pilot survey did not include this demographic question (n = 111).
3 Australia demographics (gender, age and state of residence) are for persons aged 18 years and over, sourced from the TableBuilder available from the
Australian Bureau of Statistics based on the 2011 Census data (http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/tablebuilder?
opendocument&navpos=240). TableBuilder is an online self-help tool that enables users to create tables, graphs and maps of Census data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172971.t002
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Table 3. Respondents’ preferences by scenarios: (1) all else being equal and (2) benefit and cost trade-offs.
Scenario
population 1
Cohort Choice Prioritise
population 1
Equal allocation
to both
populations
Prioritise
population 2
Choice Scenario population 2
N (percentage,
95% CI)
N (percentage,
95% CI)
N (percentage,
95% CI)
Severe disease Com All else being
equal1
1624 (52.7, 51.0–
54.5)
1286 (41.8, 40.0–
43.5)
170 (5.5, 4.7–6.4) All else being
equal1
Moderate disease
1 Little health
improvement
392 (25.6, 23.4–
27.8)
700 (45.7, 43.2–
48.2)
441 (28.8, 26.5–
31.1)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.14; p
<0.001
OR = 1.32;
p = 0.004
OR = 9.66; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
751 (48.5, 46.0–
51.1)
663 (42.9, 40.4–
45.3)
133 (8.6, 7.3–10.0) Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 0.70;
p<0.001
OR = 1.07;
p = 0.52
OR = 2.49;
p<0.001
No other medicine
available
Com All else being
equal1
1652 (53.6,51.9–
55.4)
1121 (36.4, 34.7–
38.1)
307 (10.0, 8.9–
11.1)
All else being
equal1
Several other
medicines available
1 Little health
improvement
639 (41.7, 39.2–
44.2)
594 (38.7, 36.3–
41.2)
300 (19.6, 17.6–
21.7)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.38; p
<0.001
OR = 1.25;
p = 0.04
OR = 3.20; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
867 (56.0, 53.5–
58.5)
519 (33.5, 31.2–
36.0)
161 (10.4, 8.9–
12.0)
Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 1.26;
p = 0.04
OR = 0.73;
p = 0.007
OR = 1.10;
p = 0.57
Medicines work in
a new way
Com All else being
equal 1
1213 (39.4, 37.7–
41.1)
1523 (49.4, 47.7–
51.2)
344 (11.2, 10.1–
12.3)
All else being
equal1
Medicines work in a
similar way to
existing medicines1 Little health
improvement
477 (31.1, 28.8–
33.5)
599 (39.1, 36.6–
41.6)
457 (29.8, 27.5–
32.2)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.51; p
<0.001
OR = 0.50; p
<0.001
OR = 5.71; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
675 (43.6, 41.1–
46.2)
583 (37.7, 35.3–
40.2)
289 (18.7, 16.8–
20.7)
Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 1.55;
p < 0.001
OR = 0.42;
p < 0.001
OR = 2.19; p
<0.001
Patients reliant on
carers for their
day-to-day needs
Com All else being
equal1
1204 (39.1, 37.4–
40.8)
1342 (43.6, 41.8–
45.3)
534 (17.3, 16.0–
18.7)
All else being
equal1
Patients remain
independent
1 Little health
improvement
483 (31.5, 29.2–
33.9)
584 (38.1, 35.7–
40.6)
466 (30.4, 28.1–
32.8)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.45;p
<0.001
OR = 0.72;
p = 0.003
OR = 3.19; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
673 (43.5, 41.0–
46.0)
591 (38.2, 35.8–
40.7)
283 (18.3, 16.4–
20.3)
Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 1.72;
p < 0.001
OR = 0.53; p
<0.001
OR = 1.21;
p = 0.19
Patients who are
not financially well
off
Com All else being
equal1
1920 (62.3, 60.6–
64.1)
931 (30.2, 28.6–
31.9)
229 (7.4, 6.5–8.4) All else being
equal1
Patients who are
financially well off
1 Little health
improvement
801 (52.3, 49.7–
54.8)
558 (36.4); 34.0–
38.9)
174 (11.4, 9.8–
13.1)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.35; p
<0.001
OR = 2.02; p
<0.001
OR = 2.07; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
995 (64.3, 61.9–
66.7)
420 (27.1, 25.0–
29.4)
132 (8.5, 7.2–10.0 Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 1.30;
p = 0.03
OR = 0.67;
p = 0.001
)OR = 1.22;
p = 0.28
(Continued )
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Table 3. (Continued)
Scenario
population 1
Cohort Choice Prioritise
population 1
Equal allocation
to both
populations
Prioritise
population 2
Choice Scenario population 2
N (percentage,
95% CI)
N (percentage,
95% CI)
N (percentage,
95% CI)
Children Com All else being
equal1
1171 (38.0, 36.3–
39.8)
1696 (55.1, 53.5–
56.8)
213 (6.9, 6.0–7.9) All else being
equal1
Adults
1 Little health
improvement
440 (28.7, 26.5–
31.0)
748 (48.8, 46.3–
51.3)
345 (22.5, 20.4–
24.7)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.44;
p < 0.001
OR = 0.59; p
<0.001
OR = 6.93; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
808 (52.2, 49.7–
54.8)
624 (40.3, 37.9–
42.8)
115 (7.4, 6.2–8.9) Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 3.45; p
<0.001
OR = 0.29; p
<0.001
OR = 0.97;
p = 0.93
18 months
survival without
treatment (End of
life)
Com All else being
equal1
814 (26.4, 24.9–
28.0)
1532 (49.7, 48.0–
51.5)
734 (23.8, 22.3–
25.4)
All else being
equal1
60 months survival
without treatment
1 3 month
survival gain
371 (24.2, 22.1–
26.4)
839 (54.7, 52.2–
57.2)
323 (21.1, 19.1–
23.2)
6 month
survival gain
OR = 1.00;
p = 1.00
OR = 1.31;
p = 0.01
OR = 0.68;
p = 0.003
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
604 (39.0, 36.6–
41.5)
649 (42.0, 39.5–
44.5)
294 (19.0, 17.1–
21.1
Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 3.73; p
<0.001
OR = 0.57;
P < 0.001
)OR = 0.52; P
<0.001
Cancer Com All else being
equal1
1049 (34.1, 32.4–
35.8)
1773 (57.6, 55.8–
59.3)
258 (8.4, 7.4–9.4) All else being
equal1
Non-cancer disease
1 Little health
improvement
426 (27.8, 25.6–
30.1)
697 (45.5, 43.0–
48.0)
410 (26.7, 24.5–
29.0)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.58; p
<0.001
OR = 0.37; p
<0.001
OR = 8.05; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
731 (47.3, 44.7–
49.8)
651 (42.1, 39.6–
44.6)
165 (10.7, 9.2–
12.3)
Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 3.02; p
<0.001
OR = 0.32; p
<0.001
OR = 1.21;
p = 0.29
Rare disease Com All else being
equal1
800 (26.0, 24.4–
27.6)
1311 (42.6, 40.8–
44.3)
969 (31.5, 29.8–
33.1)
All else being
equal1
Common disease
1 Little health
improvement
345 (22.5, 20.4–
24.7)
574 (37.4, 35.0–
39.9)
614 (40.1, 37.6–
42.6)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.67;
p = 0.003
OR = 0.74;
p = 0.01
OR = 2.10; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
564 (36.5, 34.1–
38.9)
603 (39.0, 36.5–
41.5)
380 (24.6, 22.4–
26.8)
Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 3.14; p
<0.001
OR = 0.59; p
<0.001
OR = 0.54; p
<0.001
costs the PBS
$5000/saves
patients $4960 per
month
Com All else being
equal1
1264 (41.0, 39.3–
42.8)
1357 (44.1, 42.3–
45.8)
459 (14.9, 13.7–
16.2)
All else being
equal1
costs the PBS $100
per month to
subsidise and saves
patients $601 Little healthimprovement
478 (31.2, 28.9–
33.6)OR = 0.34; p
<0.001
578 (37.7, 35.3–
40.2)OR = 0.70;
p = 0.001
477 (31.1, 28.8–
33.5)OR = 5.00; p
<0.001
improves
health
considerably
2 No cost trade-off question for cohort 2
(Continued )
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cost trade-off scenarios represent a trade-off in the total number of patients who could be
treated.
Responses to the cost trade-off scenarios (n = 1547) indicated a significant reduction in the
proportion of respondents choosing to divide resources equally and a shift in preference
towards allocating resources to the populations that were more costly to treat for all allocation
criteria with the exception of severity of disease. Despite the increased treatment costs and the
resulting decreased number of total patients who can be treated with the available resources,
50% or more of the respondents expressed a preference for allocating greater amounts of PBS
money on medicines (1) treating diseases for which there is no alternative treatment available
on the PBS instead of diseases where several alternative treatments are available (56.0%), (2)
treating diseases that affect patients who are not financially well off rather than those that affect
patients who are financially well off (64.3%), (3) treating children instead of adult patients
(52.2%), (4) treating patients whose diseases affect their ability to work as opposed to those
who are able to work (50.4%), and (5) treating life-style unrelated diseases rather than diseases
that are related to life-style related diseases (58.1%).
Relationship between respondents characteristics and allocation
preferences
Multivariable logistic regression for each of the 12 allocation criteria was conducted in order
to investigate if there was a difference between allocation preferences (favouring population 1
versus equal allocation versus favouring population 2) under the assumption of ‘all else being
Table 3. (Continued)
Scenario
population 1
Cohort Choice Prioritise
population 1
Equal allocation
to both
populations
Prioritise
population 2
Choice Scenario population 2
N (percentage,
95% CI)
N (percentage,
95% CI)
N (percentage,
95% CI)
Patients unable to
work without
treatment
Com All else being
equal1
1441 (46.8, 45.0–
48.6)
1225 (39.8, 38.0–
41.5)
414 (13.4, 12.3–
14.7)
All else being
equal1
Patients able to work
without treatment
1 Little health
improvement
566 (36.9, 34.5–
39.4)
643 (41.9, 39.5–
44.5)
324 (21.1, 19.1–
23.3)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.42; p
<0.001
OR = 1.39;
p = 0.002
OR = 2.10; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
779 (50.4, 47.8–
52.9)
569 (36.8, 34.4–
39.2)
199 (12.9, 11.2–
14.6)
Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 1.54;
p<0.001
OR = 0.63; p
<0.001
OR = 1.06;
p = 0.77
Patients whose
disease is
unrelated to life-
style
Com All else being
equal1
1593 (51.7, 49.9–
53.5)
1189 (38.6, 36.9–
40.4)
296 (9.7, 8.7–10.8) All else being
equal1
Patients whose
disease is related to
life-style1 Little health
improvement
650 (42.4, 39.9–
44.9)
641 (41.8, 39.3–
44.3)
242 (15.8, 14.0–
17.7)
improves
health
considerablyOR = 0.40; p
<0.001
OR = 1.34;
p = 0.01
OR = 2.51; p
<0.001
2 Twice the cost
of population 2
899 (58.1, 55.6–
60.6)
502 (32.4, 30.1–
34.9)
146 (9.4, 8.0–11.0) Half the cost of
population 1
OR = 1.94; p
<0.001
OR = 0.51; p
<0.001
OR = 0.93;
p = 0.74
1 Pooled results of cohorts 1 and 2 (n = 3080).
Abbreviation: Com = combined cohorts 1 and 2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172971.t003
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equal’, after adjusting for confounders. Results suggested that respondents’ preferences for
allocation were influenced by their individual characteristics and circumstances. The results
are summarised in Table 4.
Specifically, respondents with dependent children were significantly more likely to favour
the funding for medicines for children (over adults), medicines for cancer diseases (over non-
cancer diseases), and medicines for rare diseases (over common diseases) than those without
children. Respondents who do not have private health insurance were significantly less likely
to express a funding preference for treating patients whose diseases affect their ability to work
(over those who are able to work despite their diseases) compared with those with private
health insurance.
Respondents with a household income higher than $20,000 per year were more likely to
express a preference for prioritising treatment of severe diseases (compared to moderate dis-
ease), treating patients for whom there are no alternative treatments available on the PBS
instead of diseases for which several alternative treatments are available.
Respondents who are not in full time employment were more likely to favour treating
patients who were not financially well-off (over those who are financially well-off patients),
treating children (over adults), and treating life-style unrelated diseases (vs. life-style-related
diseases). In addition, respondents aged 25 years or older were less likely to prioritise medi-
cines for severe diseases (vs. moderate diseases), medicines for children (over adult patients),
medicines for rare diseases (vs. common diseases) and ‘end-of-life treatments’.
In summary, all multivariate models satisfactorily fitted the data (p-value >0.05) except for
‘end-of-life treatment’ (p = 0.03), but the deviation between the observed and predicted out-
comes of the model was minor.
Discussion
Consideration of public preferences is desirable when making decisions about the funding of
medicines given that the general public are both the payers and beneficiaries of any publicly
funded health technologies [16, 26]. There is, therefore, an increasing recognition of the
importance of taking into account public and patient preferences both in general and in rela-
tion to specific funding decisions [11]. Understanding what patients and the general public
value about new medicines can improve alignment between government and societal prefer-
ences. This will, in turn, assist decision-makers to understand what societies are willing to sup-
port and forego in exchange for access to medicines [11].
The selection and reimbursement of prescribed medicines is inherently challenging and at
times ethically controversial given the legislated requirement to consider the safety, efficacy,
cost effectiveness and standard of manufacture of new medicines. This must be done using an
evidence-based’ framework. In that context, where and how do public preferences/opinions fit
into the decision making process? In Australia, the PBAC is not obliged to accept community
preferences or opinions. But in seeking those very views the decision makers have an obliga-
tion to consider them in light of their charter to meet desired social objectives for the pre-
scribed medicine budget. Inevitably that involves trade-offs and choices when considering the
distribution of benefits and potential harms and costs of a particular decision. The key issue is
that the whole process is informed by the best available information–including public prefer-
ences–and that there is transparent process for making an informed decision.
Under the assumption of ‘all else being equal’, this study suggests that severity of disease,
diseases for which there is no alternative treatment available on the PBS (representing unmet
need), diseases that affect patients who are not financially well off and life-style unrelated dis-
eases are supported by the public as resource allocation criteria.
Societal views on access to publicly subsidised medicines
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Further, contrary to some views [27–30] and somewhat surprising given the existence of
“special funds” both in Australia and internationally for cancers and for rare diseases [31, 32],
this study suggests that anti-cancer medicines and rare disease therapies per se are not factors
that strongly drive public funding priorities. In fact, a large proportion of respondents
favoured equal allocation of PBS money between (1) medicines for cancer vs. non cancer dis-
eases (57.6%), and (2) medicines for rare vs. common diseases (42.6%). Notwithstanding the
above, many new and expensive anti-cancer drugs are intended for rare cancers that are severe,
life-threatening and for which there is no alternative treatment available on the PBS. There-
fore, the public might nonetheless be supportive of resources being allocated to them.
When the assumption of treatment effectiveness or treatment costs are varied, it appears
that allocation preferences are sensitive to both the health gains that may be realised and the
number of patients who may benefit from a particular treatment. Under the health benefit
trade-off condition, with the exception of ‘end-of-life treatment’, removing the assumption of
equal treatment effectiveness generally led to a statistically significant shift in preferences
towards the population that gained a considerable improvement in health and away from pop-
ulations that gained a little improvement in health. Responses to cost (and corresponding
number of patients treated) trade-off scenarios indicated a significant reduction in the propor-
tion of respondents choosing to divide resources equally and a shift in preference towards
devoting resources to the population that were more costly to treat for all criteria with the
exception of severity of disease. The shift in respondents’ preferences to the populations that
were more costly to treat may be driven by a reluctance to set priority based on cost, a concern
with ensuring access to treatment based on need and/or a desire to not disadvantage patients
with a high cost illness—even if this means that population health is not maximized [11, 17,
33, 34].
Resonance with earlier studies
In line with the results of previous studies of public values [16, 17, 35, 36], this study provides
evidence that members of the general public give higher priority to medicines used for the
treatment of severe illness and for those with no available alternative, while no compelling evi-
dence for prioritising ‘end-of-life treatments’ was observed. In the absence of other differences
in patient or disease characteristics, or treatment effectiveness or costs, 49.7% of respondents
divided resources evenly between ‘end-of-life therapies’ and ‘non end-of-life therapies’. How-
ever, previous studies suggested that the general public and patients with a life limiting illness
expressed a preference/higher willingness to pay for treatments that could improve quality of
life and value quality of care [20, 37, 38].
Comparison with the UK study by Linley et al 2013. Results for societal preferences for
8 of the 12 allocation criteria examined in this study were compared with the UK study by Lin-
ley et al [17]: (1) severity of disease, (2) availability of alternative medicine, (3) carer burden,
(4) disadvantaged populations, (5) children, (6) ‘end-of-life treatments’, (7) cancer diseases, (8)
rare disease therapies. In summary, there was a striking level of consistency between the views
and preferences on allocation criteria in the general public of the UK and Australia.
Preferences under the assumption of ‘all else being equal’
Two of the three criteria identified by the UK participants as valid National Health Service
(NHS) resource prioritisation criteria were supported by the Australian respondents. Both
studies suggest, all else being equal, that severity of disease and disease for which no other
available treatments exist are supported by society as valid NHS/PBS resource allocation crite-
ria (disease severity: 59.6% and 52.7%; no other medicine available: 56.5% and 53.6% of
respondents from the UK and Australian studies, respectively). Respondents in this study also
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expressed a preference for treating diseases that affect patients who are not financially well off
(i.e. the disadvantaged populations) while the UK public supported prioritisation of medicines
that reduce reliance on informal carers.
Preferences under health gain and cost trade-offs
The UK study did not include a benefit trade-off question relating to carer burden. There-
fore, results relating to the benefit trade-off conditions for seven of the eight allocation criteria
were compared. Similar to the UK general public [17], participants in this study expressed a
shift in preferences towards the populations that gained a ‘considerable improvement in
health’ and away from the populations that gained a ‘little health improvement’ with the excep-
tion of ‘end-of-life treatments’ when faced with health gain trade-offs.
Under the cost trade-off conditions, participants in this study and the UK study expressed a
statistically significant shift in preferences towards the populations that were more costly to
treat for all eight allocation criteria, with the exception of severity of disease.
Implications for policy making
Implications for PBAC deliberations. The factors that are taken into consideration by
the PBAC, as described in the 2013 PBAC guidelines [21], include readily quantifiable factors
such as comparative cost effectiveness, comparative health gain, patient affordability in the
absence of PBS subsidy, financial implications for the PBS and the Australian Government
health budget, as well as less quantifiable factors such as uncertainty, equity, presence of effec-
tive alternatives, severity of medical condition treated, ability to target therapy with the pro-
posed medicine precisely and effectively to patients likely to benefit most and development of
resistance. Individual factors are not weighted equally by the PBAC in its decision making and
the trade-offs involved in arriving at a recommendation, are not explicitly specified.
This study provides evidence of societal support for two of the PBAC decision criteria: dis-
ease severity and lack of alternative therapy for the medical condition being treated.
However, only 41% of respondents favoured prioritising patients whose out of pocket costs
without PBS subsidy would be high compared to those whose out of pocket costs would be
low.
In summary, the findings of this study suggest that the views of the Australian community
are aligned with the PBAC when it comes to prioritising medicines that target severe diseases
and/or for diseases for which there is no alternative treatment available on the PBS. However,
‘patient affordability in the absence of PBS subsidy’ may not be a shared prioritisation criterion
between the PBAC and the general public.
Opportunity cost. The general public were less concerned about the opportunity cost of
decisions (maximising population health), than they were about ensuring that resources are
devoted to populations that are more costly to treat. This may be driven by concern for ensur-
ing that patients whose diseases are expensive to treat are not disadvantaged, a desire to give all
patients equal opportunity for access to treatment and/or a willingness to sacrifice health gains
for a ‘fair’ public system over a single minded focus on efficiency of maximising population
health [11, 17, 33, 34]. Given that cost to the PBS and government is one of the key criteria
used in public funding decision for new medicines, this difference may explain the observed
conflict between public and policy makers’ priorities when medicines are denied funding
apparently on the basis of cost-ineffectiveness alone.
Rule of rescue criteria. The PBAC allows for consideration of ‘Rule of Rescue’ (RoR) cri-
teria as part of its decision making process. A RoR applies in exceptional circumstances for
pharmaceuticals that provide a worthwhile benefit for a severe and rare condition for which
there is no alternative treatment [15, 21]. For drugs that meet the RoR criteria, the PBAC
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could potentially reverse a decision not to recommend listing on the basis of comparative cost-
effectiveness (and any other relevant factors). This study explored three of the four criteria for
PBS listing under the RoR, namely disease severity, lack of alternative treatment option and rar-
ity of a disease [21]. Although disease severity and lack of alternative medicine for the medical
condition were supported as allocation criteria by our participants, we observed no compelling
evidence to support the rarity of disease criterion. In this study, only 26% of respondents
favoured prioritising patients with a rare disease in the absence of any other differences.
Life saving drugs program criteria. Through its Life Saving Drugs Program (LSDP), the
Australian Government provides subsidised access to expensive and life saving drugs that are
not eligible for funding under the PBS, for very rare life-threatening conditions [32]. To
receive LSDP funding, there are eight criteria that a drug must meet. This study explored three
of the LSDP criteria: lack of alternative treatment options, rarity of a disease and affordability
of the medicine. Although lack of alternative treatment option was supported in this study, the
other two criteria (rarity of disease, patient affordability due to cost of the drugs) were not
regarded as important in determining the distribution of subsidised PBS medicines by our
respondents. This suggests that the use of rarity, and patient affordability as health technology
assessment funding criteria for the LSDP appear to be open to question and require further
scrutiny.
It is worth noting that the LSDP is currently under review by the Australian Government.
The review examines issues such as access and equity, value for money and the future adminis-
tration of the programme [39]. The public consultation/submission process for the LSDP
review was closed in 2015. However, there is no timeframe specified for the outcome of the
review.
Strength and limitations
The strengths of this study were that it included a large, broadly representative sample
(n = 3080) of the Australian population. The format adopted for eliciting preferences of the
survey allowed an easy comparison of shift in preferences to provide a complete picture of
respondent trade-off behaviours using either health gains or costs alone. The results of this
study are consistent with other studies and notably a study by Linley et al [17], upon which
this study was based.
This study has limitations. The main limitation is that we simplified the survey task for par-
ticipants by varying one allocation criterion at a time. We did not ask the public to consider
multiple allocation criteria simultaneously, as the PBAC must do for any given submission.
Whilst this study allowed for the rank ordering of relative importance of each allocation crite-
rion, no conclusions can be made about any interaction effects among criteria. As such, it
would be useful to capture these complexities in future research. To minimise respondent bur-
den and the number of criteria explored in this study, we also did not include all of the criteria
considered by the PBAC for PBS and LSDP listing. Due to the study design, details for non
responders were not available for analysis or assessment for potential bias.
Another potential limitation relates to framing bias. The questions in this study were
framed to encourage expressions of societal preferences for the distribution of prescribed med-
icines. We did not seek individual’s views on direct questions of opportunity cost–a concept
operationalised by the use of cost effectiveness information by the expert government commit-
tee. It is also possible that respondents’ own interpretations of the allocation scenarios have the
potential to influence their expressed preferences.
The results of this study suggest that respondent preferences may be influenced by their per-
sonal circumstances. While some of these relationships have clear and plausible explanations,
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some are more difficult to explain. For example, relationship observed for respondents without
private health insurance and their expressed preferences for lifestyle unrelated diseases.
Implications for future research
Understanding and incorporation of public preferences and public engagement in public find-
ing allocation for medicines is an important step towards ensuring the legitimacy, relevance
and fairness of decision making and might reduce conflicts between public and payers regard-
ing public funding allocation [11, 35, 40]. The results of this study give a clear picture of public
preferences regarding medicines resource allocation and demonstrate that the general public
are capable of giving opinions on distributional preferences. To enable effective integration of
public and patient preferences into funding decisions, further research on defining a strategy
to incorporate public perspectives into PBAC decision making processes is required.
Conclusion
Given that decisions about funding of new medicines have a direct impact on the general pub-
lic through cost and access constraints [26], it is important that these decisions/decision mak-
ing process take into account societal preferences and the community’s willingness to pay
alongside the needs of the patients. Knowledge of public preferences and values allow policy
makers to better understand the societal issues of importance and has the potential to reduce
conflicts between public and payers regarding public funding allocation [11, 35, 40].
Bodies such as the UK’s NICE and Australia’s PBAC have the expertise and resources to
assess questions of comparative clinical benefit, cost, safety and quality of manufacture. They
are also well-placed to consider the opportunity cost of funding prescribed medicines. But it is
the general public who are best placed to consider societal views on the fairness of those deci-
sions. By any measure, almost all organised effort is expended in assessing the efficiency of
funding decisions for prescribed medicines. Comparatively little effort is expended in consid-
ering the distributional consequences of expert committee recommendations. A person-cen-
tered approach to health care implies that we ask the public how they want spending decisions
to reflect their preferences for the distribution of benefits and costs of prescribed medicines.
Therefore, if there is a commitment that public preferences matter, then it would be important
for decision makers to consider and incorporate the public perspectives as part of the funding
decision making process.
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